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I. INTRODUCTION 
Veneration for the Constitution is a staple of American 
political culture, as is vigorous debate about the meaning of 
specific terms. Yet events of recent years have raised pointed 
questions about the Constitution's viability: is it truly well-
adapted in today's world for delivering on the promises of its 
Preamble; or is it, rather, maladapted, ineffective, and obsolete? 
Does the Constitution adequately describe how we are actually 
governed; and, if not, need we be concerned? 
1. Professor of Government, Harvard University. 
2. Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
3. John H. Watson Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
4. Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. 
5. Professor Emeritus, Johnson C. Smith University. 
611 
612 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:611 
Short of formal amendment, the common way to remedy 
perceived defects of the Constitution has been by shifts in 
interpretation. The Supreme Court has done this on many 
occasions, with varying political impact. Some of these shifts 
focused on personal rights, others on governmental powers. Some 
were enabled by transformative Court appointments, but others 
reflected shifts in opinion prompted by dramatic national and 
world events or successful political movements. AJl were able to 
draw support from scholarship that criticized the previously 
dominant interpretations. Perhaps the most significant shift was 
the abandonment in the 1930s of doctrines that had severely 
restricted both governmental regulation of the economy and 
broad delegations of power by Congress to bureaucratic agencies. 
A major consequence was a tremendous increase in the size of the 
federal executive branch, the scope of its powers, and the money 
it spends. These changes have aroused continued controversy as 
to their wisdom, with some supporters and critics regarding them 
as tantamount to constitutional-or unconstitutional-
revolution. The controversy, however, has played out largely in 
political and academic discourse, not in the judiciary. 
In recent years, the discourse has shifted in surprising ways. 
As late as 1988, Sanford Levinson's Constitutional Faith 6 sought 
to find coherent meaning in a close and reverential reading of the 
Constitution's text. By 2006, Levinson was calling for a new 
Convention to remedy its profound defects. 7 Other scholars, 
however, see no need for formal amendment or replacement. 
Instead, they contrive to find in the Constitution, as it stands, 
principles and virtues wildly different from the familiar literal 
readings and traditional understandings. The conventional 
discourse shows signs of exhaustion. 
This essay considers three recent books that boldly but 
differently defend remarkably strong views of the powers our 
Constitution bestows on the presidency: The Royalist Revolution, 
by Eric Nelson; The Executive Unbound, by Eric Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule; and Secrets and Leaks, by Rahul Sagar. All three come 
from prestigious presses, with jacket blurbs from a diverse group 
of prominent scholars. These may surprise, until we reflect that 
veneration for the presidency has never been confined to a narrow 
ideological faction. Presidents of all parties have consistently 
6. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (19XX). 
7. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) IX0-94 
(2006). 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 613 
appealed to it, argued for it before Congress and the courts, and 
gained significant, often bipartisan support. Political leaders 
deeply opposed to incumbent presidents have historically tended 
to attempt capturing the office, not to weaken it. 
Presidential powers, as Madison observed, thrive most 
dangerously in times of war: "Of all the enemies to public liberty 
war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded .... [T]he discretionary 
power of the executive is extended .... No nation could preserve 
its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."x Today, we find 
ourselves in an era of permanent war, or at least its threshold. In 
addition, Congress, the primary institutional check on executive 
power, is held these days in unprecedented contempt. This 
suggests the question, how far are we from outright (if elective 
and term-limited) monarchy? The books at issue argue that in 
effect we already have one, and it's a good thing, too. 9 (Full 
disclosure: I have long argued that our Constitution imposes 
lawful restraints on the president, withholding monarchical 
10) powers. 
II. THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION 
Eric Nelson's work is an intellectual history of the 
presidency, exploring the views about monarchy of prominent 
Americans during the colonial, revolutionary, and Constitution-
framing eras. His thesis is that pre-revolutionary colonists loved 
and admired the king, whose predecessors had chartered their 
colonies and granted them substantial self-rule. When Parliament 
began to impose new taxes and commercial regulations, they saw 
this as usurping the king's prerogatives, and looked to him, the 
foremost guardian of the rights of British subjects, to preserve 
their liberties. Only after he ignored their many pleas did they 
turn against him and pursue independence. While some thereafter 
followed Thomas Paine's lead in Common Sense, 11 opposing 
anything that smacked of monarchy and adopting "whiggish" 
State constitutions with feeble executives, "royalist" leaders like 
Ben Franklin, James Wilson, John Adams and Alexander 
Hamilton adhered to the view that the British monarchy had in 
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fact proven too weak, and that a strong republic would require an 
extremely powerful executive. At the Constitutional Convention, 
Nelson claims, they prevailed. "The very same principles that had 
underwritten the patriot campaign to rebalance the imperial 
constitution in favor of the Crown demanded in 1787 the creation 
of a recognizably Royalist constitution for the new United States" 
(p. 7). 
In support, Nelson offers a raft of letters, pamphlets, 
sermons, etc., from colonists that extol the blessings of 
monarchical "prerogative," placing these in the context of 
ongoing debates about the flaws of the British Constitution as the 
source of the colonies' increasing plight. These writers often 
denounced the corruption of Parliament and/or their lack of 
representation therein, even while debating competing theories of 
representation and different views of the limits of Parliament's 
power to legislate concerning the colonies. Some highlighted the 
tyranny over Britain of the Long Parliament after the execution 
of Charles I, hailing the Stuart Restoration as a return to more 
balanced government, but lamenting the incompleteness of the 
restored prerogative, in that the king's veto power had fallen into 
disuse. Colonists repeatedly reproached George III for failing to 
veto the laws to which they objected. 
Nelson takes issue with scholars who have dismissed 
arguments like these as perhaps insincere and self-serving, aimed 
at justifying actions whose real motives were different. He shows 
that this "royalist" line of thought survived the advent of 
independence and had some influence on later constitution-
making. His depiction of the Constitution of 1787 as a triumph of 
royalism, however, falls seriously short. It is utterly clear the 
colonists' arguments, however sincere, were context-driven, and 
that none offered a coherent theory of representation or of 
legitimacy capable of persuading modern readers who believe in 
majority rule, local self-government, equal human dignity or a 
fundamental right to vote. All seem to have accepted the obsolete 
concept of "virtual representation," though differing on its 
rationale, and many agreed that the colonies were outside the 
"realm" of Parliament's jurisdiction, governed only as the 
personal "dominion" of the king. These viewpoints are simply 
irrelevant to a proper understanding of presidential powers under 
the U.S. Constitution. 
The terminology of the documents can be confounding to 
readers today. Quite often, statements seem incoherent or 
inconsistent with other views of the speaker. For example, we 
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commonly think of the powers of Parliament and of "the Crown" 
as mutually exclusive. Yet in 1621 we find Lord Baltimore 
opposing proposed legislation regarding Virginia by arguing that 
"if Regall Prerogative have power in any thinge it is this ... 
Virginia is not annex't to the Crowne of England And therefore 
not subject to the Lawes of this Howse [of commons]'' (p. 39). 
Nelson does wonders trying to make sense of his materials, but 
one may doubt sometimes whether they really do make sense, or 
whether his interpretations are the only ones plausible. 
Nelson launches his account with a confusing 1775 debate in 
Parliament, where the wisdom of Coercive Acts against the 
colonies became entangled with the question whether to 
commemorate the "martyrdom" of Charles I. The Whig John 
Wilkes opposed both measures and depicted the colonists as 
sharing his opposition to royal prerogative rule. Yet Lord North 
mocked Wilkes for joining the colonists, who he claims were 
advocating Tory principles that extended prerogative across the 
ocean, while halting parliamentary authority at the shore. 
Nelson's summary, in turn, places the colonists even to the right 
of 1775 Tories, "drifting perilously close to Jacobitism" (p. 31). 
The history reviews numerous occasions where colonists pleaded 
the constitutional theories of "dominion" and royal prerogative 
mentioned above. Jefferson and John Dickinson were significant 
exceptions, in that they, while agreeing that Parliament had 
overreached its powers, voiced concern also at the prospect of 
unbridled royal tyranny and rejected the Jacobite nostalgia 
expressed by others. George III's determination to defend and 
enforce the laws passed by Parliament made these constitutional 
debates largely moot, but Nelson, anticipating the Declaration of 
Independence, argues paradoxically that in denouncing there 
only the king and ignoring Parliament, patriots only reaffirmed 
"their continuing attachment to the neo-Stuart theory of empire" 
(p. 65). 
The next step examines more closely the contending concepts 
of representation espoused by patriots. On one view, that term 
required a body whose composition reflected that of the whole 
people. Hanna Pitkin, in The Concept of Representation, 12 
presented this as John Adams's view. Nelson, however, maintains 
that Adams's focus was on authorization: the people had a right 
to erect any government they wished, including a hereditary 
limited monarchy, which would then be "the representative of the 
12. HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-61 (1972). 
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whole nation, for the management of the executive power" (p. 
67). Still, it is clear that Adams strongly endorsed the principles 
of separation of powers and rule of law. It was the inclusion of 
these in the British system that enabled him to call that system a 
"republic." Those principles seem incompatible with a concept of 
prerogative in the sense of rule outside the law. 
Whether or not the king could represent them, patriots were 
agreed that Parliament did not. None, of course, were advocates 
of the modern norm of universal suffrage. They accepted the idea 
that members of Parliament "virtually" represented even voteless 
inhabitants of Britain. But here they parted ways: some simply 
insisted that the colonists had never authorized Parliament to 
represent them. Others argued that voting was a necessary 
condition for authorization, and the colonists had no votes for 
Parliament. Some went so far as to assert that "one could only be 
said to have authorized a representative for whom one had voted" 
(p. 70), raising thorny questions about whether those who might 
abstain or vote for the losing side are represented. No adequate 
theory of representation emerges here-least of all Nelson's 
royalist theory of representation through royal prerogative. 
Oddly absent is the slogan, "No taxation without representation," 
and the history of demands made and later retracted for seats in 
Parliament, amidst occasional British offers of same. That omitted 
tale leaves an impression that "no taxation" was the only point on 
which the colonists were clear and united. 
Next, Nelson focuses on the impact of Paine's Common 
Sense. Paine's attack on the evils of monarchy revived an old 
debate regarding two Old Testament passages on the 
appropriateness of that institution for the Hebrews. The passages, 
from Deuteronomy and Samuel, respectively, appear to look both 
ways. On one interpretation, they can be reconciled by focusing 
on the contingent vice of unbridled discretion; on the other, by 
citing the inherent vice of idolatry, of bowing before man rather 
than God. Nelson places Common Sense firmly in the second 
camp, where prerogative is not the issue. Thus, the republican 
turn sparked by Paine could accommodate the essence of the 
royalism of other patriots, which was prerogative power and not 
the trappings of monarchy. Nelson acknowledges in passing that 
Paine himself was always "a committed opponent of prerogative 
power" (p. 144 n. 182), but ends the section with an approving 
reference to John Adams's 1789 characterization of the new 
Constitution as "a monarchical republic, or if you will, a limited 
monarchy" (p. 145). 
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Nelson's review of state constitution-making from 1776 to 
1780 shows that many states had vigorous debates over executive 
powers, and the veto power in particular. In general, the whiggish 
opponents of prerogative prevailed. The "royalists," though, for 
the most part (Franklin excepted) adhered to their convictions 
and bided their time. Adams, who had consistently maintained 
that a republic must be "an Empire of Laws and not of Men" (p. 
161), now advocated for the states a relatively strong governor, 
endowed with the veto and "the whole Executive Power," yet 
limited to three one-year terms in office and, significantly, 
divested "of most of those Badges of Domination call'd 
Prerogatives" (p. 162). At first, only South Carolina accepted the 
veto power. In contrast, Pennsylvania in 1776 opted for a 
unicameral legislature and a subservient, plural executive. James 
Wilson's movement to right the balance was successful in 1790; 
New York had adopted a qualified veto power in 1777 and 
Massachusetts had done so in 1780. Nelson sees the tide here 
shifting back toward "sweeping prerogatives" (p. 177). 
We come at last to the federal Constitution of 1787. The 
Convention of that year was a response to perceived defects of the 
Articles of Confederation. While its primary aim was creating a 
stronger central government vis-a-vis the states, Nelson focuses 
entirely on the creation of a new, separate executive branch. The 
Virginia Plan, which largely set the Convention's agenda, had 
simply called for a "National Executive" to be chosen by the 
legislature, and endowed with authority to execute the laws and 
the (unspecified) "Executive rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation." From the outset of debate, the structure and 
powers of the executive were entangled with the method of its 
selection-whether by Congress, popular vote, or otherwise. 
James Wilson's proposal for a single executive, elected by the 
people for a limited term and endowed with an "absolute 
negative" (pp. 185-186), encountered objections on every score. 
Randolph, Sherman, Dickinson and Franklin thought the plan 
smacked of monarchy, while Hamilton thought the president 
should serve for life or during good behavior. Wilson was obliged 
to acknowledge that "he did not consider the Prerogatives of the 
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive 
powers" (p. 189). The Convention ultimately rejected both 
popular election and the absolute negative. The president's veto, 
treaty and appointment powers were limited; his term was four 
years, and he was made subject to impeachment. 
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Nelson reviews the ratification debates, In which 
Antifederalists continued criticizing the presidency, while 
Federalists, and Hamilton in particular, defended it by depicting 
its powers as less than those of either the British king or New 
York's governor. Federalists made no public reference to a 
"monarchical republic." In private, meanwhile, Convention 
delegate Abraham Baldwin, according to Max Farrand's The 
Framing of the Constitution of the United States, was writing: "Nor 
did it appear that any Members in Convention had the least Idea 
of insidiously laying the Foundation of a future l\1onarchy .... 
But were unanimously guarded and firm against every Thing of 
this ultimate Tendency." 13 
According to Nelson, the leading Framers had fought to 
establish "a transcendent chief magistrate, one who would stand 
above faction .... " (p. 231 ), and drafted "a recognizably Royalist 
constitution, investing its chief magistrate with the very same 
prerogative powers that Charles I had defended against the great 
whig heroes of the seventeenth century" (p. 232). I would suggest, 
however, that no president, including Washington, has succeeded 
in standing above faction. Moreover, had the Federalists openly 
avowed their Constitution as royalist, it would not have been 
ratified. If we began with a royalist Constitution, then, it was a 
work of stealth. 
The Royalist Revolution does not directly address current 
issues in constitutional law, whether those about specific 
presidential powers or broader questions about the binding force 
of Framers' intent/original meaning. Given the gulf between 
historians' and jurists' methods and concerns, this seems wise. Yet 
Nelson's findings leave room for presidentialists to offer them in 
support of expansive readings of presidential power, including 
arguments that presidents have "inherent power" to act outside 
of or even against the law. Nelson's work does not and cannot 
support such arguments. While some delegates to the Convention 
were admirers of what they saw as the British constitution, they 
could not have copied it if they chose, for Britain had no written 
constitution. Patriots' various, shifting and conflicting 
conceptions of "prerogative," "representation," or even 
"republican" were not debated, let alone codified and ratified. By 
1800, the High Federalist views of Hamilton and Adams were 
13. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OPTHE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
162 (1lJ13). 
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mocked and rejected. The Constitution as we know it reflects 
Madison's insight that power corrupts. 
III. THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 
Eric Posner and Adrian V ermeule focus on the special 
demands of the modern administrative state, in which, they 
maintain, competence and power belong overwhelmingly to the 
executive branch, and the traditional, legalistic checks and 
balances of the "Madisonian republic" are obsolete. Congress and 
the courts now play essentially reactive and marginal roles. The 
authors are quite comfortable with this state of affairs, since it is 
essential to effective government. 
They begin with a sharp critique of "liberal legalism"- the 
view that law does and should constrain the executive. The reality, 
they hold, is that in the modern administrative state, such legal 
constraints are "shaky in normal times and weak or nonexistent 
in times of crisis" (p. 4). For this point they draw upon the legal 
thought of Carl Schmitt, the "crown jurist of the Third Reich," 14 
though they reject his contempt for democracy. Schmitt has grown 
remarkably popular of late, with 420 law review citations since the 
year 2000. Schmitt argued that the pace and complexity of modern 
life pose challenges that legislatures and courts are institutionally 
incapable of managing. 
The chief reasons for the failure of liberal legalism to 
constrain executive power are emergency and delegation. Why 
Schmitt's authority is essential for these points is not obvious. The 
Weimar Constitution that Schmitt deplored expressly provided 
for its suspension by the executive during emergencies; ours does 
not. If constitutions matter, that would be an advantage for the 
U.S. system. Delegation, the authors say, flowed inevitably from 
the size and complexity of the tasks entrusted to modern 
government during and since the New Deal, tasks which Congress 
could not but delegate to a growing bureaucracy. Early judicial 
resistance to delegation withered after 1937. Wars and economic 
emergencies have prompted further, sweeping assertions of 
executive power. While Congress has enacted a number of 
framework statutes aiming to limit and oversee executive 
discretion, these have proven largely ineffective in the face of 
complexity, secrecy, and collective action problems that weaken 
Congress and the courts. Even when laws are clearly violated, 
14. See Charles E. Frye, Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political, 2X J. POL. XIX (1966). 
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there is often no effective remedy available. Yet, the authors 
insist, the election system forces politicians to maintain their 
popularity and credibility and to submit to extraordinary scrutiny 
by a highly educated population. Politics and publilc opinion thus 
supply sufficient nonlegal constraints on executive power: "The 
administrative state generates the cure for its own ills" (p. 14). 
There follows a powerful, extended critique of Madison's 
theories of separated powers and checks and balances. First, he 
wrongly predicted that officeholders' ambitions would generally 
lead them to vigorously defend the powers of their current office. 
Second, his assumption that Congress and the courts will monitor 
the workings of the executive has been rendered obsolete by the 
increased complexity and scale of the latter. Third, the legislative 
and judicial processes are too cumbersome to keep pace with the 
policymaking of the modern administrative state, to which so 
much power is necessarily delegated. 
The first point rests on several aspects of the collective action 
problem: many members of Congress will be loyal to the president 
as their party leader; many will see his leadership as essential in 
times of crisis; and (my own point) not a few may themselves hope 
to be president one day. In short, the interests of a congressman 
do not always coincide with the powers of that place. Second, 
congressional monitoring is hindered by scant resources, lack of 
expertise and entrenched secrecy. The judiciary labors under 
similar disadvantages; while a few famous cases have announced 
checks on executive power, these have been the exception and not 
the rule. 
Posner & V ermeule illustrate their case with detailed 
accounts of two crises: 9/11 and the 2008 financial crash. After 
9/11, Congress quickly enacted measures delegating broad new 
powers to the administration, though not everything it had 
requested. Litigation on the scope of these delegated powers, as 
well as the additional, inherent powers repeatedly claimed by the 
administration, eventually produced three Supreme Court 
decisions that, although they ruled against the government on a 
number of narrow points, in practice left its hands virtually untied 
regarding its indefinite detention and surveillance programs. The 
financial crisis yielded a similar mix of unilateral executive actions 
and largely successful requests for expansions of delegated power, 
which could then be given extremely sweeping interpretations by 
the Bush and Obama administrations. For the authors, the 
legislative role in these episodes exhibited little Madisonian 
deliberation and self-regard, but ample signs of Schmittian 
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helplessness. "[T]he executive asks to take three steps forward; 
Congress, pushing back somewhat, has no choice but to allow it 
to take two" (p. 45). Post hoc congressional oversight has been 
relatively feeble-even, surprisingly, under conditions of divided 
government; judicial review has been too late and too deferential 
to make much difference. Insofar as courts eventually announce 
limits to executive power, "the public will not take much notice of 
those precedents, and they will have little sticking power when the 
next crisis rolls around" (p. 54). On the other hand, 
the sheer complexity of the government response to regulatory 
problems limits the impact of a single person, and renders 
inappropriate the use of words like "dictator" to describe the 
president .... [A] large area of public policy is determined by 
a self-replicating career bureaucracy .... The traditional 
separation-of-powers model docs not, of course, capture this 
phenomenon (p. 59). 
The "unitary executive" theory is not mentioned. 
The authors next offer a novel theory of constitutional 
change. Contrary to Nelson's view, executive supremacy was not 
inscribed in the 1787 Constitution; rather, the Madisonian 
Constitution has profoundly changed via unorthodox routes. 
Neither formal Article V amendment, judicial interpretation, nor 
Ackerman's moments of "higher lawmaking" 15 could produce the 
quantity and speed of constitutional change that a dynamic polity 
demands. Formal amendment is unwieldy and rare, and many 
serious constitutional questions go unlitigated. Ackerman's 
"moments," meanwhile, are vaguely defined, yet surely too 
infrequent to supply the needed, routine, medium-size 
adjustments. Instead, constitutional change occurs through 
interbranch "showdown" conflicts mediated by public opinion-
"a special kind of politics accompanied by legalized rhetoric" (p. 
63). "Constitutional conflict over the distribution of policymaking 
authority is continual and ubiquitous" (p. 66). 
The authors' first example of these showdowns is 
impeachments, which, they claim, "inevitably create precedents" 
(p. 63). They describe Lincoln's unpunished defiance of a habeas 
decree as "a (nonjudicial) constitutional precedent" (p. 69). With 
legalism repudiated, it is unclear just what "precedent" or 
"constitutional" are to mean, beyond describing successful 
15. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991 ); 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (199X); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
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political actions. Indeed, they acknowledge that important 
precedents often continue to be controversial. However, if one 
branch totally or partially acquiesces in the actions of another, this 
can create "a political precedent couched in constitutional terms" 
(p. 71) that may have "some positive force in decision making 
during later periods" (p. 72). Rational actors, after all, must weigh 
the benefits of following precedent against the costs. 
Often, say the authors, disagreements about the allocation of 
constitutional authority are settled in the short term by the force 
of public opinion. The influence of "public constitutional 
sentiment" is felt when a showdown threatens to paralyze the 
government, rousing important elites, interest groups and others 
to attention. Then, the competing claimants to authority must 
assess their respective degrees of public support in order to decide 
how far to press their positions. The authors acknowledge that 
public constitutional sentiment is not necessarily profound or 
even intelligent, yet its indirect influence legitimates the outcome 
under our "plebiscitary constitution." Whether or not the 
competing views are based on "good-faith interpretation of 
relevant texts and traditions," somehow the prevailing view will 
reflect "more fundamental, quasi-constitutional instincts than the 
views that prevail in ordinary politics" (p. 78). 
Now, Ackerman identifies the 1936 election as a 
constitutional moment. My father, who had a law degree, voted 
for FDR in that election. When I asked him whether he was 
thereby endorsing FDR's theory of federal power under the 
Constitution, he responded, "He was a good guy. I wanted to give 
him a chance." In The Executive Unbound's remarkable extension 
of Ackerman's theory, the public voice is heard without holding a 
single election; nor is it ascertained through opinion polls. Their 
hypothetical example, in which Congress wants to end a war and 
the president wants to continue it, raises the question: what 
chance is there that actual public opinion would be based on views 
of the two branches' constitutional authority, as opposed to the 
wisdom of the war itself? In short, "public constitutional 
sentiment" is probably a political fiction, akin to virtual 
representation. Nelson offered us constitutional creation by 
stealth; here we have constitutional reform by stealth. 
Posner & Vermeule go on to examine "framework statutes" 
designed to constrain executive power, such as the War Powers 
Resolution, the National Emergencies Act, the Inspector General 
Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. All but the last are 
declared to be relatively or even utterly ineffective, due to 
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congressional laxity in using their override provisions and in 
punishing violations of their various requirements. Presidents and 
Congresses alike know that in cases of showdown, by and large 
"the public will be unlikely to care too much about the legal 
niceties" (p. 88)- a statement in sharp tension with that quoted 
above from page 78. As for the AP A, while it does impose some 
constraints on executive agencies in normal times, it does not 
apply to the President himself, exempts a range of national 
security affairs, and is not strictly enforced by the courts in 
situations of perceived emergency. Such APA terms as ''agency," 
"agency action," "military or foreign affairs functions," 
"committed to agency discretion," and "for good cause," as 
interpreted by the courts, leave many important decisions outside 
the checking powers of other branches. 
Anticipating legalist objections that their theory of 
constitutional change makes the rule of law a mere fa~ade, the 
authors assure us that 
Candor is not always desirable, and hypocritical lip-service to 
the rule of law may even be best for the (thick) rule of law in 
the long run .... The best way to preserve those norms or 
values may be to draw a veil of decency over behavior that 
everyone knows is going on (p. 103). 
They do not make clear in what sense "everyone knows" what is 
going on, or knows that escape hatches from liberal legalism are 
a Schmittian necessity, or in what "thick" sense these escape 
hatches preserve the rule of law. Nor do they show how, in the 
absence of candor, public constitutional sentiment can validly 
referee charges of unlawful executive action. 
The authors' account of the real, effective constraints on the 
executive begins with a broad, remarkably sanguine statement: 
Through its long history and all of its wars and crises, the U.S. 
government has generally been responsive to the public 
interest, and has always ranked as a leader among countries 
around the world in ... democratic responsiveness and civil 
liberties. And American practices in these respects have only 
improved over the decades and centuries, during the same 
period in which the separation of powers has eroded (p. 113). 
This claim is documented by a single comparative political science 
source that relies on a few objective indicators. Its assumed 
validity is then explained by reference to the election and party 
systems, and by the political culture's allegedly deep distrust of 
executive power. Elections allow the public to remove leaders 
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whose conduct does not serve their interest; hence the ubiquity of 
elections, it is said, in the worlds of business, universities, and 
government-as if all of these domains were democratically 
governed. The national election system is admittedly flawed by 
rent-seeking and lack of voter information, but the authors do not 
see that the separation of powers is a necessary or sufficient cure 
for such flaws. In any event, it opens the door for gridlock that 
makes the system unworkable-thus, there seems to be "a general 
sense among the political elites that the erosion of separation of 
powers has not been a bad thing" (p. 120). Despite the distrust of 
executive power, it is Congress that takes the blame for gridlock. 
The concentration of power in the executive, they maintain, 
has actually resulted in the advancement of our liberty. Presidents 
must strive to maintain popularity and credibility, and so the 
public's (undocumented) commitment to civilliberties 16 obliges 
them to act accordingly. Presidents know the voters' "ultimate" 
preferences, which are assumed to be fixed; presuJnably, support 
for liberty is such a preference, though support for separation of 
powers is not. Well-motivated or not, presidents use various 
strategies to maintain credibility, so that their exercise of 
discretion will be trusted. They know that excessive secrecy might 
undermine this effort, and the authors assert, re1narkably, that 
there is no evidence for such an excess. (Here they cite an article 
by Rahul Sagar.) 17 Presidents can purport to "bind themselves" by 
relying (non-bindingly) on independent agencies and 
commissions, bipartisan appointments, multilateral! engagements, 
promises of transparency, or even, as a last resort, by requesting 
express statutory authorization. 
True, it is hard for the public to know whether the executive 
is indeed well-motivated, but the risk that the public will fail to 
trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the opposite 
risk. Trust is justified, because in general "[t]he president knows 
the range of options available, their likely effects, their expected 
costs and benefits-thanks to the resources and expertise of the 
executive branch" (p. 130). If mistakes are made by a well-
motivated executive, it is only because "greater accuracy would 
not have been cost-justified" (p. 131 ). These astoundingly 
optimistic statements fit uneasily with certain more sober 
comments: "Bush's policies in the war on terror might have been 
16. See generally ROBERT MCCLOSKEY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF 
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 232-73 (19X3). 
17. See Rahul Sagar, On Combating the Abuse of State Secrecy, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 404 
(2007). 
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optimal, insufficient, or excessive; we will not know for many 
years, to whatever extent the fog of history will allow us to know 
at all" (p. 135). There is, at least, "a middle range in which voters' 
information and competence are high enough that the credibility 
mechanisms are useful, but not so high that voters can just directly 
assess whether the executive has good motivations and is adopting 
optimal policies" (p. 152). At any rate, "the unchecked executive 
is generally too weak to adopt abusive policies" (p. 153). 
(Apparently, it is self-evident that the Iran-Contra affair, the 
second Iraq War, and the Bush-Obama counterterrorism policies, 
presumably motivated by sincere patriotism, do not count as 
abuses.) 
This account depicts an implausible world of highly 
informed, entirely rational actors, where the public is united- not 
polarized- around fixed and meaningful constitutional 
sentiments. A benign, invisible hand operates in the political 
sphere, so that government action is presumed to serve the public 
interest, regardless of what is done and even regardless of the 
laws. Our system of electoral accountability is not unduly 
weakened or distorted by factors such as the electoral college, 
gerrymandering, legal restrictions on voting, the electoral power 
of money, subservient media, negative campaign ads, poor 
schooling, public ignorance and apathy, hero worship, pervasive 
secrecy, or the permanent bureaucracy (most of which are not 
even mentioned). This fable seems grounded in theoretical law 
and economics speculation, not empirical evidence. It ignores the 
fact that, though unpopular presidents may have difficulty 
obtaining desired legislation, they can still use executive orders 
and the Commander-in-Chief power to undertake muscular 
initiatives. 
The authors next consider, and predictably reject, the 
proposition that international law can be an additional check on 
the American executive. While courts may regard human rights 
treaties and the laws of war as binding in principle, experience 
shows that the norms are vague and that violations generally have 
no effective sanction. International bodies are weak, foreign 
courts can rarely effectively intervene, and domestic courts are 
almost always deferential to the executive. Occasional references 
to foreign or international law in interpreting the United States 
Constitution have proved highly controversial, and a number of 
important treaties have failed of ratification or been saddled by 
the Senate with weakening reservations. In sum, "global liberal 
legalism seems like a rearguard action- an ideological effort to 
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reconcile the new era of executive power with traditional notions 
of rule of law" (p. 175). 
The ensuing discussion of "tyrannophobia'" argues that 
liberal legalism displays an exaggerated fear of tyranny, because 
it overlooks the political constraints on executive power identified 
above. Our country has never come close to a dictatorship, but 
tyrannophobia likely deserves no credit for this good fortune. 
Much discourse about tyranny is hyperbolic: occasional abuses of 
power by an elected leader, or even time-limited dictatorships, do 
not amount to true dictatorship. Moreover, even true dictatorship 
need not be catastrophic for public welfare, in tenns of its social 
and economic policies; though he is not mentioned here, one 
senses the ghost of Schmitt nodding approvingly. 
The authors trace tyrannophobia back to the founding era. 
They state, contrary to Eric Nelson, that, along with Caesar and 
Cromwell, 1 ames II and George III were antirnodels for the 
Framers. Colonists had exaggerated views of the king's actual 
powers; the king, not Parliament, was the focus of the Declaration 
of Independence. Post-revolutionary constitutions established 
extremely weak executives, but experience with legislative 
tyranny prompted a movement to strengthen the national 
executive. After a prolonged stalemate, the Framers created an 
independent executive, vested with vague, undefined powers, 
whose limits would be subject to ongoing debate- including 
about "the executive power to violate laws in order to protect the 
nation" (p. 184 n. 31). 
Over time, presidential power has shown a gradual upward 
trend, punctuated by cyclical peaks and valleys. Wars, in 
particular, expand presidential power, which contracts with the 
return to peace. "Americans admire the military but the culture is 
not militaristic" (p. 186). (Apparently, the authors are not familiar 
with typical July 4 crowd celebrations.) Powerful presidents long 
tended to be followed by weaker ones, perhaps due to political 
backlash; yet the most powerful presidents, such as Lincoln and 
FDR, have gained the approval of history. FDR's administration 
was a watershed; since then, only Nixon's abuses-though 
actually "pathetic stuff" (p. 200)-created a major backlash. 
Is tyrannophobia a valuable, strong constraint on the 
executive; an irrational, strong obstacle to needed institutional 
change; or just insignificant rhetoric? Cross-national surveys 
provide no evidence that tyrannophobia is more prevalent in 
democracies; rather, it is general demographic variiables, such as 
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wealth and its distribution, education, and ethnic and linguistic 
homogeneity, or else overlapping social cleavages, that 
distinguish democracies from non-democracies. "The 
contemporary United States is too wealthy, with a population that 
is too highly educated, to slide into authoritarianism" (p. 193). 
Even if tyrannophobia was justified at the Founding, today it is 
"an element of the broader paranoid style in American politics" 
(p. 195). The erosion of legal checks and the overlooking of 
political checks on the presidency (which have actually grown 
stronger) drive ongoing, irrational distrust. "The modern 
presidency is a fishbowl ... [to] a wealthy, educated population 
and a super-educated elite whose members have the leisure and 
affluence to care about matters such as civil liberties, who are 
politically engaged, and who help to check executive abuses" (pp. 
201-202). Even so, "There is no evidence that tyrannophobia 
deters low-level executive abuse ... for an educated and leisured 
population, and the regular cycle of elections, will themselves 
check executive abuses" (pp. 203-204). A very puzzling footnote 
adds: "We do not claim, however, that we live in the best of all 
possible worlds. When the executive engages in abuses, legal or 
constitutional reform may be justified" (p. 204 n. 96). Here they 
cite certain legalist reform proposals, tx though, in view of their 
antilegalist stance, they cannot endorse the necessity or efficacy 
of same. 
The book concludes with several reassuring remarks: 
Congress retains the power to make laws, regulate the 
bureaucracy and create independent agencies; declarations of 
emergency and actions taken thereunder must face the prospect 
of withering public skepticism; post-Watergate governments will 
not dare to target and monitor political opponents. Each of these 
claims invites rebuttal, based respectively on gridlock; the wars in 
Iraq and Libya; and FBI surveillance of environmental and 
Occupy activists, plus unprecedented prosecutions for leaking. 
The Executive Unbound's account of the desuetude of legal 
checks on executive power is persuasive and disturbing. The 
argument for sufficient political constraints, however, is abstract 
and empirically flimsy; the ease of propagating an overwhelming 
sense of emergency makes those constraints especially fragile. 
Finally, the admiring use of the ideas of the unrepentant Nazi Carl 
Schmitt is, to say the least, in very questionable taste. 
1K See Sanford Levinson & Jack Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and 
Design, Y4 MINN. L. REV. 17XY, 1 X5X (2010). 
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IV. SECRETS AND LEAKS 
Rahul Sagar's Secrets and Leaks is a narrowly focused paean 
to executive secrecy regarding foreign and military affairs. His 
heroes among the American founders are largely those Nelson 
identifies as the leading, royalist Framers of the Constitution- in 
particular, Wilson, Hamilton and Adams. The book is timely, in 
view of debates about alleged abuses connected with the War on 
Terror, the invasion of Iraq, and the massive leaks by Chelsea 
Manning and Edward Snowden. It is well written and copiously 
footnoted, with an extensive bibliography of historical, legal and 
political science sources. 
Sagar emphasizes the difficulty of designing an effective 
regulatory framework to prevent the abuse of state secrecy. "[S]o 
long as there is state secrecy, our ability to guard against its misuse 
depends not so much on the checks and balances established by 
the Constitution as on the virtues and vices of those men and 
women who secretly take the law into their own hands in order to 
either open our eyes or close our minds" (p. 7). This premise is 
reminiscent of the antilegalist approach of Posner & Vermeule, 
though it speaks of personal virtue rather than political 
calculations. Despite this discounting of constitutional checks, the 
author proceeds to place the Constitution at the heart of the 
dilemma. The crucial aspect of the Constitution is the sweeping 
powers it vests in the president, on whose virtue we must then 
depend. 
To support the proposition that the Framers subscribed not 
to a "principle of disclosure" but instead to one of secrecy, Sagar 
cites "republican" writers from Renaissance Italy and the 
absolutist Stuart monarchy, who taught that the state's flourishing 
in a world of international and domestic conflict depends on a 
regular and secure practice of secrecy. The capaciousness of his 
use of "republican" is evident in the book's opening epigram-a 
quote from Machiavelli's The Prince. 19 Machiavelli indeed taught 
that "virtu" was the prime ingredient for princely success, and the 
sole restraint on his actions. That thinker returns only on the final 
page, where Sagar exhorts us to "forgo platitudinous calls for 
'transparency' and quixotic endeavors to tame 'the prince"' (p. 
204); yet his spirit is evident throughout. 
19. NICCOLO MACIIIAVELLI. TilE PRINCE (W.K. Marriott, trans., J.K. Dent & Sons 
195X) ( 1515), available at https://chooks.adclaidc.cdu.au/m/machiavclli/niccolo/m149p/ 
complctc.html. 
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Expounding the constitutional separation of powers, the 
author argues that only the executive is endowed with the 
information, unity and energy needed to make national security 
decisions wisely and quickly, and to keep them confidential. 
Sharing the relevant information with Congress is unsafe, since 
individual members are prone to leak secrets confided to them, 
even when the body ordains secrecy. Thus, disclosure to Congress 
cannot be deemed constitutionally required. Courts, meanwhile, 
lack expertise and must be deferential when national security is at 
stake. 
After convincingly showing, through many episodes over the 
years, that "neither Congress nor the courts have intervened 
strongly" against excesses of executive secrecy (p. 48), the author 
goes on to argue, reminiscent of Posner & Vermeule, that they are 
structurally incapable of doing so. Due to want of information, of 
incentives and of effective sanctions, they cannot reliably compel 
disclosure. Where national security is concerned- and Sagar 
insists that it is for the president alone to determine when this is 
the case- the separation of powers is hopelessly ineffective. 
Besides, he argues, it is a luxury we cannot afford; the other 
branches have wisely accepted doctrines such as the state secrets 
privilege and executive privilege, recognizing that "necessity 
knows no law" (p. 82). In the end, it seems, those doctrines are 
grounded more in perceived necessity than in the constitutional 
text. 
Sagar challenges critics of secrecy to prove that, overall, the 
harms caused by abuses of secrecy exceed those caused by 
unauthorized disclosures (p. 93). Having deftly shifted the burden 
of proof to the other side, he needs to say little about the harms 
or benefits of the many secrets and leaks he offers as examples. 
Instead, he falls back upon the claim that, because the other 
branches lack the expertise and institutional capacity to keep 
secrets, mandated sharing of information with them cannot be 
safe. 
His historical and institutional analyses lead the author to the 
very plausible conclusion that the most effective practical check 
against abuses is the leaking of the secrets. This prompts a close 
inquiry into the conduct of leakers and whistleblowers. Sagar 
provides insightful analysis of the options, incentives and risks 
that would-be leakers encounter. Unless the leaks are beneficial 
to the president, prospects for the leaker are generally bleak, 
suggesting that leaks might not be excessively common. Yet the 
author offers a normative claim ostensibly based on democratic 
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theory: Only the president is elected nationwide and empowered 
to determine the national interest on behalf of the People; thus, 
would-be leakers have no business substituting their judgment for 
his. 
Sagar repeatedly recognizes that secrecy can be abused, but 
his vision of the virtuous presidency leads him to a very narrow 
definition of abuse. Not just any unlawful act will qualify, but only 
unlawful acts that deliberately pursue selfish rather than truly 
national interests-as if presidents do not generally believe that 
what is good for them is good for the country. Excluding Congress 
and the public from vital decisions in which they have a right to 
participate is not itself an abuse (pp. 127-130). Given this narrow 
definition, the author easily concludes that, while on rare 
occasions leaks may be necessary to expose the gravest abuses, for 
the most part leaks are unjustified and potentially harmful. His 
foremost worry is that leaks can sometimes cause gigantic 
harms- which cannot themselves be publicly detailed, for fear of 
causing even more damage. Necessarily, his examples are 
hypothetical. 
Though disabled from examining the motives and judgments 
of secret-keepers, Sagar speculates at length about the possible 
bad motives and judgments of leakers. By their "usurpation" of 
the president's personal authority to determine what must be 
secret (p. 114), leakers make themselves subject to criminal 
sanctions, unless they can meet a stringent five-point test to justify 
their conduct. The disclosure must (1) concern an abuse of public 
authority, as narrowly defined; (2) there must be clear and 
convincing evidence of wrongdoing (difficult or impossible to 
come by); (3) the leak must not pose a disproportionate threat to 
public safety (also hard to know); ( 4) the means of disclosure must 
be the least drastic possible (publication to the world being the 
most drastic); and (5), leakers must identify themselves and be 
prepared to undergo the predictable formal and informal 
sanctions. Thus, leakers must accept the burden of proving that 
the president's motives were improper, and, in addition, of 
proving that their own motives in leaking inforn1ation are not 
biased by "sectional," "partisan," or "personal" motives. 
The author's policy recommendations accordingly focus 
primarily on steps to reduce the incidence of leaking. He is 
skeptical of the Posner/Vermeule proposal that presidents 
enhance their credibility by resorting to bipartisan appointments 
and multilateral actions, since those steps will limit the president's 
plenary control (pp. 189-191 ). Instead, he exhorts the press to 
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employ greater self-restraint, and advocates for "an independent 
and well-funded organization dedicated to scrutinizing media 
performance, which could name and shame reporters and editors 
who misuse anonymous sources, and the publishers who condone 
such behavior" (p. 201 ). 
Secrets and Leaks has the skilled rhetorical earmarks of a 
carefully balanced argument; yet its positions on questions of 
historical interpretation, constitutional theory and democratic 
theory are extreme. Central here is the Machiavellian emphasis 
on voter-determined presidential virtue as the sole and sufficient 
safeguard. 
For example, the author's treatment of the Founding period 
is highly selective. Historians conventionally expound the conflict 
in the 1790s between Hamilton and Madison over the risks and 
benefits of executive power, concluding that the issues have 
remained unresolved. Sagar, however, barely examines Madison's 
side of the argument, using contributions by Hamilton and Jay to 
The Federalist Paperl0 to characterize the Constitution as 
profoundly Hamiltonian. While he provides ample evidence that 
the Founders often resorted to secrecy, those actions alone cannot 
establish valid legal precedents. Neither the full range of historical 
facts nor the opposing interpretations developed by me 21 and 
other writers, such as Louis Fisher22 and Heidi Kitrosser, 23 are 
seriously addressed. 
Sagar relies heavily on the so-called Jay Treaty precedent (as 
did Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Nixon 24), when George 
Washington refused to share requested papers with the House of 
Representatives, which nevertheless, moved by partisan loyalties 
and fears of war, granted funds to implement the treaty. The 
author seems unaware that this "precedent" was actually a 
sudden, unilateral, politically motivated departure from the 
previous practice, in which the president would forward requested 
documents, but sometimes ask Congress to keep them 
20. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 2-5 (John Jay), Nos. 69,70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
21. See DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THI: FOUNDING 
FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 20-33 (19X1); Daniel N. Hoffman, 
A Republic If You Can Keep It, X2 MICII. L. REV. 997 (19X4). 
22. See LOUIS FISHER, IN TilE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 221, 253--62 (2006); LOUIS FISHER, 
THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004). 
23. See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, 
EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 192-210 (2015); Heidi Kitrosser, 
Classified Information I.eaks and Free Speech, 200X ILL. L. REV. XXl (200X). 
24. United States v. Nixon, 41X U.S. 6X3 (1974). 
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confidential. Moreover, the House formally protested this 
innovation, and President John Adams soon repudiated it in the 
XYZ Affair. Yet Sagar accepts on faith that George Washington 
was virtuous, making it irresponsible to criticize his conduct. Nor 
does he recognize how the ramming through of Jay's Treaty 
exacerbated the partisan divide, leading to ongoing popular and 
press protests that in turn provoked the notorious Sedition Law 
of 1798. This dynamic of secrecy leading to protests leading to 
repressive counter-reactions should serve as a cautionary 
precedent in its own right. The historical account here also ignores 
the fact that, even though the Federalists in the 1790s were 
repeatedly outraged by leaks that they thought endangered their 
"infant empire," none of the known miscreants was prosecuted. 
Their Sedition Law did not criminalize leaking, but only 
defamatory comments. 25 Even so, it was unconstitutional by 
modern standards,26 and Jefferson's election in 1800 might be 
offered as another constitutional counterprecedent. 
The author's more recent historical materials are extensive, 
but equally selective. There is no close examination of the long 
record of troublesome wars and treaties that we have entered 
under the influence of secrets and lies. For exanaple, the roles 
played by secrecy and deception in launching and prolonging our 
Vietnam and Iraq wars are not assessed, because these are prime 
examples of politically controversial actions about which the 
president necessarily knows best. How could anyone be so 
irresponsible as to question the "talents and integrity" of virtuous 
leaders like George Washington and Dick Cheney (p. 187)? (The 
term "war crimes," by the way, does not appear in the book.) 
Sagar does show the great difficulty we have had in combatting 
excesses of secrecy, but his materials do not support his claim that 
"state secrecy is approved in principle and censured in practice" 
(p. 49); rather, they suggest the opposite. 
Though our Framers explicitly attempted to avoid the 
tyranny of centralized power and to instill the rule of law, Sagar, 
akin to Nelson, has them stealthily enshrining in the presidency a 
sweeping principle of secrecy. His claim that the Framers allowed 
the president a free hand on secrecy has no textual basis, and it 
vitiates the separation of powers and the First Atnendment. To 
capably perform their assigned roles, Congress, the courts, the 
25. See Daniel N. Hoffman, Contempt of the United States: The Political Crime That 
Wasn't, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 343, 347 (19X1 ). 
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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press and the public often need access to information held by the 
executive branch; yet he rejects the logical inference that each 
must have a corresponding power or right to obtain it. 
In particular, First Amendment protection for leaking is fully 
consistent with the Amendment's text, the Founders' scruples, 
and the novelty of prosecutions for leaking. Yet, despite having 
shown that courts are unavoidably prone to defer to executive 
power claims, Sagar confidently relies on a line of court decisions, 
mostly quite recent, holding in effect that officials are properly 
bound to secrecy: they are presidential servants, not free citizens. 
Those decisions are vulnerable to strong criticism. 27 
Only Daniel Ellsberg's unauthorized disclosures enabled us 
to realize that our government had systematically used secrets and 
lies to mobilize and sustain public support for a war of highly 
questionable value. Yet the author sees no constitutional bar to 
prosecutions for leaks under the 1917 Espionage Act-save 
perhaps for those of journalists, which he acknowledges might 
violate the freedom of the press (pp. 171-180). The notion that 
Ellsberg (or Edward Snowden, whose story post-dates the book) 
deserves to be honored and constitutionally protected from 
prosecution seems unthinkable. 
It is vital to recognize that governmental secrecy, both 
literally and in every practical sense, is a prior restraint on speech. 
Its entire purpose is to prevent anyone, including foreign enemies, 
but also members of congressional oversight committees, courts, 
the press, and voters, from learning of and responding to what the 
government is doing or contemplating. By design, secrecy 
systematically undermines official accountability, checks and 
balances, and the rule of law. It accordingly deserves the same, 
highest level of scrutiny applied to other forms of prior restraint. 
There is no basis in the Constitution or democratic theory for 
carving out a categorical national security exception to the First 
Amendment. 2x In this domain too, the wisdom and justice of 
policy depend on accurate information and a free marketplace of 
ideas. 
Giving broad discretion to the executive in the national 
security domain can easily extend into other domains, and has in 
fact done so, just as domestic executive powers have expanded in 
27. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, OUR ELUSIVE CONSTITUTION: SILENCES, PARADOXES, 
PRIORITIES 127-2X (I ()()7). 
2K See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,742 (1Y71). 
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tandem with international ones. As early as Marbury v. Madison,2l) 
the Court sought to distinguish between official actJlons pertaining 
to foreign or defense affairs and disputes affecting individual 
rights, with the former being matters of discretion and the latter 
questions of law. Plainly, however, many actions fit into both 
categories. That an action may serve national security does not 
logically imply that no right is violated. 
Moving beyond constitutional law, the democratic theory 
Sagar invokes must envision a far more active, influential role for 
the public than did classical republican theory, necessitating even 
broader access to information. Yet he asserts, akin to Posner & 
Vermeule, that leaking of secrets is very seldom warranted, 
simply because our election system adequately ensures that 
presidents will generally be virtuous. The pronounced variations 
of presidential ability, as well as virtue, do not figure in this 
argument. The author's strongly patriotic sentiments, reflected in 
the book's dedication, "To these great and glorious United 
States," somehow translate into veneration of the presidency as 
an institution, almost regardless of the conduct of its occupant-
Richard Nixon's Watergate being the sole acknowledged 
exception. Nixon, of course, believed that "when the President 
does it, that means it can't be illegal." 30 What if he had played the 
national security card, as he considered doing, and destroyed his 
tapes? Sagar's "democratic" theory is tantamount to making the 
president sovereign, not the People. Here, stealth becomes not 
just a feature attributed to constitutional adoption or change, but 
the central principle of everyday governance. 
Moreover, to argue as if the president personally made all 
decisions on secrecy wrongly conflates executive power with 
presidential power. Over one million officials currently have 
power to classify documents wholesale, subject only to vague and 
scarcely enforced standards, and presidents are easily misled by 
classified briefings. The author acknowledges that these unelected 
bureaucrats systematically favor secrecy over disclosure, and that, 
indubitably, way too much information is classified: yet these facts 
seem not to affect his weighing of risks and benefits and do not 
figure in his "democratic" theory. Secrets and lies have clearly 
played great roles in the decline of public trust in government in 
29. See generally Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1H03). 
30. Interview hy David Frost with Richard Nixon (May lX, 1977), available at 
http://www.streetlaw.org/ en/Page/722/Nixons_ Yiews_on_Presidentiai_Power. 
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recent decades. '!'o blame this decline Rrimarily on irresponsible 
leakers and publishers seems perverse.· 
Sagar does endorse Jack Goldsmith's advice32 that an 
administration "should be as open as possible, and when secrecy 
is truly necessary it must organize and conduct itself in a way that 
is beyond reproach, even in a time of danger" (p. 188). Yet it is 
difficult to show that this has generally been the case-or even 
that it has ever been the case. Because it is hard to know what 
officials have done, let alone why they did it, the author advises 
that lawmakers, judges, and the press must "refrain from picking 
sides" (p. 202). Yet picking sides is central to both democratic 
politics and the judicial process. By not picking sides about the 
recent, unprecedented burst of prosecutions for leaking, and this 
under a president who had promised unparalleled transparency, 
we effectively side with rampant executive secrecy. 13 
Y. CONCLUSIONS 
Taken together, the teaching of these three books is that, de 
facto if not de jure, we have a monarchical Constitution, and it's 
a good thing, too. They make a strong case for the ineffectiveness, 
today at least, of Madisonian restraints on executive power. Their 
complacency about our politics and disdain for the rule of law 
remain somewhat mystifying. Veneration for our "democracy" 
and the presidency are commonplace, but usually packaged with 
veneration for the Constitution and the rule of law. Our authors 
are sophisticated enough to see the tensions within this package. 
Political scientists Nelson and Sagar preserve most of the package 
by reading the Constitution as monarchical, with the prince above 
the law. Ironically, it is the law professors, Posner & Vermeule, 
who cast aside the legalist niceties of Madison's Constitution in 
favor of one advocated by the Nazi Carl Schmitt. Perhaps this is 
an unintended consequence of the debunking achieved by the 
Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements, which 
explored the workings of power under the guise of law. Neither 
law and economics rationalism nor classical republican thought 
seems to offer a satisfying account of those workings today. 
31. See also SCOTI HORTON, LORDS OF SECRECY: THE NATIONAL SECURITY ELITE 
AND AMERICA'S STEALTH WARFARE (2015). 
32. Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, THE NEW RI'PUBLIC, Aug. 13, 200X, at 35 
(reviewing ERIC LlCIITBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 
(200X)). 
33. See also CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE 0BAMA'S POST-9/11 
PRESIDENCY (2015). 
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Clearly, the Constitution inscribes the value of robust, 
effective government. Equally clearly, it inscribes restraints on 
overconcentration of power and respect for individual freedom. 
These books honor the first commitment, but disrniss the others 
as unnecessary. In place of goals always in profound tension, they 
offer us laurels for a virtuous monarchy. Neither history nor 
political science warrants this move. Their core claims are 
speculative, unrealistic and of dubious provenance: to wit, James 
I, Carl Schmitt and Machiavelli, respectively. 
Skeptics are left to mull a problematic array of hard-to-
dispute facts: a world of far-extended American power constantly 
under threat; a long list of emergency executive actions, ostensibly 
justified by highly classified information34; mainstream media that 
often fail to discover or to closely question these naoves; a public 
in position to find fault with such actions only when putatively 
unlawful leaks occur; a new practice of systematic indictment of 
leakers who oppose government policy; presidents that, 
regardless of party, generally work to maintain and expand 
executive powers, securing immunity from legal process for high-
level abusers, including their political enemies35 ; repeated 
congressional authorization of measures that value security over 
liberty36 ; a Court that interprets secrecy as an executive power 
rather than a First Amendment issue, 37 and free speech as 
whatever speech money can buy,3x leaks excepted; an education 
system focused more on vocational training than on critical 
thinking; an influential dogma of American exceptionalism that 
teaches "my country, right or wrong"; a public especially revering 
wartime presidents like Lincoln and FDR, who did whatever they 
deemed necessary; a public fascinated with Britain's royals and 
accustomed to dynasties named Kennedy, Bush, and Clinton; a 
public whose constitutional sentiments often are vague, yet 
polarized; and a public that typically, in low-turnout, 
34. Drone killings and the invasion of Iraq arc examples or varying scale and 
visibility. 
35. Though President Obama acknowledges that crimes such as torture were 
commiLLcd during the Bush administration's war on terror, his administration has not 
prosecuted those ultimately responsible; it agrees with the doctrine that high officials 
generally have at least qualified immunity from civil and criminal liability; it invokes the 
state secrets and executive privilege doctrines to withhold relevant d1JCumcnts, including 
legal advice memos, from domestic and international tribunals; and it hinders Congress 
from investigating and publicizing such abuses. 
3fi. For example, sweeping surveillance and indefinite detention without trial, under 
the Patriot Act and Authorization for Usc of Military Force Resolution (2001 ). 
37. See, e.g., Sncpp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (19HO). 
3X. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 55X U.S. 310 (2010). 
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gerrymandered elections, reelects most members of Congress, 
despite professing contempt for its ineffectual operations, while 
often perpetuating the very gridlock that it disdains. 
One may question whether we inhabit a vibrant democracy, 
or something closer to the late Roman republic. Then, we may 
contemplate the sobering possibility of a constitutional 
Convention larded with neo-monarchist delegates, perhaps 
influenced by books like these. Many calls for a new constitutional 
Convention under Article V have been submitted to Congress. 
Most were expressly aimed at a narrow, specific amendment, 
though it is quite possible that, if convened, a Convention would 
feel free to propose whatever changes it pleased, or even an 
entirely new Constitution. Congress has so far chosen not to 
tabulate together the dozens of Convention calls from different 
eras or specifying different topics. If it did, or if only five more 
states endorse the call for a balanced budget amendment, 
Congress would be obliged to call a Convention and to specify, 
without constitutional guidance, the terms for selecting delegates. 
We would then find out what the delegates want; that is not 
to say that we would find out what the American people want. 
The ancient Hebrews, it is said, desired a king; what Americans 
want today is hard to know. How and when the People can speak 
remains an essentially contested question of constitutional theory. 
Academics have always debated the Constitution's meaning; 
these three books raise the deeper question: at this point, in what 
sense do we really have a Constitution at all? Through different 
avenues, they find legally unchecked power in the president, 
making his/her wisdom and virtue our primary safeguard. We the 
People, ostensibly sovereign, seem to have great difficulty 
ascertaining what the Constitution prescribes, when and how it 
changes, whether our leaders are virtuous, or even what they are 
actually doing. Are we truly a constitutional republic, or have 
we-without a coup, formal amendment or transformative Court 
decision- been stripped of that advantage and reduced to 
lawlessness, by constitutional stealth? 
